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The Rate of Investment
THE rate of investment is a surpassingly important factor in economic
life. The short-run fluctuations in investment are large in amplitude, and
they are commonly credited with a dominant influence upon the state of
business conditions. The secular growth of capital was long considered to
be the basic determinant of the progress of an economy. In modern
times there has been a growing tendency to place more emphasis upon
the state of technological development as the prime source of progress,
but no one has argued that the provision of adequate capital is an unim-
portant part of growth and, in one view, expenditures on research are
simply investment in knowledge.
The main focus of our inquiry is upon the influence of the rate of return
on investment. This emphasis is not due to the belief that realized rates of
return are of decisive influence—indeed their relative unimportance will
be argued. The emphasis is due rather to the fact that our data on rates
of return and capital are comprehensive and comparable, whereas most
other explanatory variables influencing investrnent—for example, shifts
of consumer demands and advances in technology—involve such large
and difficult problems of data collection and analysis as to be beyond our
reach. Estimation of prospective profit rates receives some attention, and
the effects of wages upon investment are treated in Chapter 5.
1. The Rate of Return and Investment
The rate of investment in an industry is governed by its expected rate of
return, but the rate of return is itself a summary of all the forces impinging
upon the industry. Any change in costs—whether due to raw-material
prices, wage rates, taxes, or changes in technology—and any change in
consumer demands will affect prospective costs, revenues, and therefore
rates of return.
If one possessed direct and precise knowledge of (schedules of) prospec-
tive rates of return, he could by-pass all these other considerations in
predicting investment, with one qualification. Since we are dealing with
industries, not individual firms, it is probable that there will be no single
amount of capital corresponding to the weighted average of the firms'
rates of return. An increase in demand, for example, may lead to a given
average prospective rate of return (with present capital), but the
amount of investment will depend upon how the increased demand is
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distributed among the firms. If the increase is directed primarily toward
firms near capacity, it will have a different effect upon investment than
if it is directed primarily toward firms with excess capacity.
But, of course, the prospective rates of profit are not known to an outside
investigator, and even if anticipations of entrepreneurs are completely
accurate, realized (cx post) rates of return will give only one point on the
schedule of prospective rates.If it is correctly anticipated that without
additional investment the rate of return next year will be 10 per cent, the
long-run equilibrium rate being 7 per cent, then such an amount of
investment may (and, if possible, will) be undertaken that the cx post rate
will be only 7 per cent.
Realized rates of return will therefore be a clue to what they were
previously and correctly anticipated to be (in the absence of additional
investment) only to the extent that entrepreneurs were unable to make
sufficient investment (or disinvestment) to bring the rate to the equili-
brium level.If anticipations were in some degree incorrect, the cx post
rate of return may be either higher or lower.
In an empirical study, therefore, we should not expect to find a high
correlation between investment in year T and the realized rate of return
in year T.If the anticipations were perfect and complete competitive
adjustment could be made within a year (or other time period under
study), the correlation would be zero.If anticipations were correct, but
technological or other barriers prevented complete adjustment to the
long-run competitive level, investment would be positively correlated with
rates of return. Errors in anticipation, unless they were systematic, would
presumably reduce any observed correlation. On the other hand, antici-
pations that were systematically conservative, in the sense of underesti-
mating the departure of the anticipated rate of return from the competitive
average, would increase the correlation between investment rates and
realized rates of return: equilibrium would not be restored in the next
time period, so cx post returns would be above average in expanding
industries and below average in contracting industries.
To these possible reasons for a correlation between realized rates of
return and investment, one must add a wholly different consideration.
Profits fluctuate much more from year to year than dividends do, so
unusually large profits lead to unusually large retained earnings, which are
a substantial source of the increase in capital in manufacturing. In our
postwar period, retained earnings were more than one-fourth of the increase
in capital in every year, and were almost exactly one-half of the increase
in capital for the period as a whole (Table 19). Hence one might argue
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TABLE 19
INCOME, DIVIDENDS AND INTEREST PAW, RETAINED EARNINGS, AND
INCREASE IN CAPITAL, ALL MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES, 1947—58
(amounts in billions of dollars)
Retained
Earnings as
Dividends IncreasePer Cent of
and InterestRetained in Increase in
Year Income Paid Earnings Capital Capital
1947 10.5 4.4 6.2 13.6 45
1948 11.6 4.9 6.8 9.7 70
1949 9.0 5.0 4.0 2.1 190
1950 13.0 6.1 6.9 16.6 42
1951 10.9 5.9 5.0 18.5 27
1952 9.4 6.0 3.4 8.6 39
1953 9.9 6.3 3.6 6.6 55
1954 9.5 6.2 3.3 3.4 98
1955 13.8 7.3 6.5 17.1 38
1956 13.5 7.9 5.6 12.2 46
1957 12.8 8.3 4.5 6.9 65
1958 10.5 8.0 2.4 9.2 27
NOTE: Retained earnings and percentage calculated from unrounded data. Income
excludes dividends received from other corporations, and dividends paid exclude a pro
rata share of dividends received.
SOURCE: Statistics of Income, Corporation Income Tax Returns, for 1947 to 1958 (IRS).
that high profits automatically generated a large increase in capital in the
same year.
The main defect in this argument is that it views the surplus of earnings
over dividends and interest payments as an end-of-year residual which
increases the firm's aggregate resources whether the firm wishes more
capital or not.These earnings normally accrue over the year, not on
December 31, and if the enterprise does not wish to increase (or decrease)
dividends or investment commensurately, it can reduce its short-term
(or, to some extent, long-term) liabilities. Only if the capital structure of
the firm does not allow debt reduction (or increase) or if the capital markets
are very imperfect (so retained earnings are a much cheaper source of
capital than new borrowings or equity issues) will the current profits have
a simple arithmetic effect upon total assets. The "arithmetic" influence
of current profits upon current investment may therefore be quite small,
and subsequent findings suggest that it is small.'
The preceding argument on the relationship between investment and
cx post profits requires little modification if the industry is monopolized.
There is less likelihood that the equilibrium rate of return will be stable
'Seep. 76.
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over time:this rate is set by the conditions of the particular industry,
whereas the average rate in the competitive industries is set by the sum of
their diverse conditions.But the equilibrium rate will be all that is
observed cx post if the industry correctly anticipates and fully adjusts to
changes in supply and demand conditions.2
Even if an industry were in long-run equilibrium each year so the rate
of return was (approximately) constant, investment would be highly
correlated with the factors that led to changes in the equilibrium position.
If demand grew, the stock of capital would parallel the physical output of
the industry. If changes in factor prices led to a substitution of capital for
labor, the stock of capital would parallel increases in wages relative to the
cost of capital.If technology advanced—and here we have no reliable
quantitative measure—the stock of capital might either increase or de-
crease. Of course, to the extent that durable and specialized forms of
capital were involved, long-run equilibrium could not be attained each
year even with perfect foresight.3
Direct increases in demand (shifting of the industry's demand curve to
the right) are measured approximately by receipts of the industry. If the
increase in demand is not fully anticipated, prices will rise above their
long-run equilibrium level, and receipts may increase in greater or less
proportion than the horizontal shift of the demand schedule—normally
a quantitatively minor complication.4
Reductions in cost are also measured, less perfectly, by changes in out-
put. A reduction in costs will lead to a reduction in price and hence to an
increase in output and, in general, the larger the reduction in costs, the
greater the increase in output. If demand is elastic, increase in output will
in turn be accompanied by an increase in receipts.
Since conditions of demand are usually less stable in the short run than
those of cost, and since changes in receipts may measure changes in both
demand and cost, receipts of the industry will be used as the primary
index of the demand for capital.
2Tothe extent that monopoly declines over a period, investment and realized rates
of return should be negatively related.
For example, even if the future availability of an improved machine were known,
an unimproved machine might have to be built this year.
Let the industry have a constant long-run equilibrium price p0, and let the demand
shift to the right by a factor A, i.e., the old demand curve is q =f(p)and the new demand
curve is Af(p).Thenreceipts will rise in the ratio
pAf(p)—
A Azp(l + i)
pf(p)
—+ p
where tp is the excess of price over p0 and iiisthe elasticity of demand.
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ANNUAL RELATIONSHIPS
Let us turn to the evidence. All the possible regressions of relative increase
in capital on relative increase of receipts and either current or preceding
year profit rates have been calculated for the period 1948 to 1957 (Table
20) .Theyagree almost too well with expectations! In every case, the
overridingly important influence on the rate of investment is the change in
receipts: this is the only consistently significant regression coefficient, and
even its magnitude is remarkably stable.Except during the depression
year, 1949, the relative change in capital was approximately six-tenths of
the relative change in receipts. On average, somewhat over half the
variance of relative changes in capital is explained by the relative change
in receipts.
The current profit rate plays a negligible role in the regression equations:
it is significantly different from zero only in 1950, 1951, and 1956, and in
the former year it has a negative sign. The preceding year's profit rate is
better behaved: it is almost consistently positive and is significant (at the
5 per cent level) in five (and almost so in 1957) of the nine years.6 One
possible interpretation of this finding is that this year's profit rate is used
as predictor of next year's profit rate—which would be a sensible short-run
rule, as our study of the stability of the industrial pattern of profit rates
indicated.Investment in durable goods is, of course, less sensitive to
short-run fluctuations in rates of return. There is another interpretation,
however, which will be discussed shortly.
Our findings on the accelerator relation cannot readily be compared
with those obtained (usually from data on individual companies) by
others, because our capital concept (all assets except investments in other
companies) is much broader than that usually employed. In fact, most
investigations seek to relate gross investment in plant and equipment to
changes in sales. This narrower concept is appropriate if it is believed that
The considerable degree of direct control over investment during the war makes the
earlier period less interesting; however, it is analyzed in the longer period regressions
(see below).In the postwar period the aircraft industry, which underwent extreme
fluctuations, was omitted, usually with little effect upon the regressions for three-digit
industries.
These two sets of regressions seem to support the argument (text accompanying
Table 19) that the "arithmetic" effect of retained earnings on the increase of assets need
not be of much importance.If it were, the relationship of investment to profit rates
should not only be substantial but also larger for current than for preceding year profit
rates.
As a further test of the arithmetic effect of retained earnings on investment, the resi-
duals from the regressions of relative investment on current profits and relative change in
receipts were correlated with the ratio of retained earnings to income, for 98 industries.
In neither 1949 nor 1950 was there any correlation.
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TABLE 20
ANNUAL REGRESSION OF RELATIVE CHANGE IN CORPORATE CAPITAL ON
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SOURCE: Tables A-36 to A-59; and Statistics of Income, for 1947to 1957.
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the technological ties between output and fixed capital are closer than
those between output and total capital. But there is no presumption that
this is true:it is almost certainly not true in the short run, when the
relationship of fixed plant to output is highly variable; and it is not very
plausible even in the long run.If fixed and working capital are sub-
stitutable, as of course they are, the presumption will in fact be that total
capital has a more stable relationship than fixed capital has to output.
The same presumption holds with respect to rates of return: we should
expect net investment to be more sensitive than gross fixed investment is
to changes in profit prospects. For gross investment will be influenced by
replacement needs as well as by profits, and again the substitution between
fixed and working capital enters to weaken the relationship, especially in
the short run.
Eisner's estimates of the accelerator relation are based upon a distributed
lag model, in which investment in durable goods this year is related to
changes in sales in this and each of several previous years.7 The sum of
these coefficients for 1955 is .72, or .48 if firms making gross fixed invest-
ments of more than 40 per cent of their total fixed assets are excluded.
Current and earlier profit rates had no systematic relationship to invest-
ment. The profit rates in this study are highly ambiguous, however: they
are total earnings divided by fixed assets, which are a variable and minor
fraction of total assets. The better performance of profits in the study of
separate industries, where this profit measure is somewhat less dubious,
suggests that the measure may have had an important effect on the results.
The well-known study of Meyer and Kuh is even more difficult to
compare with our work. The net profit variable is again measured on
gross fixed investment, and the change in sales enters into two of their
variables—directly, and in a capacity measure.8Their finding that
change in sales has no important effect on investment,9 while the "capacity
effect" is positive,10 may arise in part from this multiple use of change in
sales.
Robert Eisner, "A Distributed Lag Investment Function," Econornelrica,Jan.1960,
pp. 1—29.
8Thechange in sales relative to gross fixed investment is also measured. The capacity
measure is defined as followslet (K/S)m be the minimum ratio of fixed capital to sales
during 1946—49. The capacity measure is then (K/S),S,, where S1 is sales in the given
year.If (S1 —S1_1)/K1is the direct measure of sales change, clearly this variable and
S1KJS,_, are not independent.
The partial correlation coefficients are often negative, and significant in only 5 of
75 cases (John R. Meyer and Edwin Kuh, The Investment Decision: An Empirical Study,
HarvardUniversity Press, 1957).
0Thecorrelation coefficients are generally significant and positive in 1946 and 1947,
but not in the next three years (ibid., p. 122).
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Meyer and Kuh kindly supplied the simple correlations for their sample,
and these were used to calculate for each of fifteen industries equations of
the form,
ES -=a+bj+c—-'
where F is fixed investment, ir is previous year's profits, and IXSischange
in sales in the given year. The lagged profit variable was much more
influential than the change in sales, as shown below.







All significant regression coefficients were positive. The relatively poor
performance of changes in sales suggests that the sales of individual firms
contain random fluctuations which are large relative to changes in sales,
so industry sales may be a better index, even for a firm, of changes in its
demand. 11
LONGER-PERIOD RELATIONSHIPS
One source of ambiguity in the interpretation of annual rates of invest-
ment is that they are subject to large errors of measurement. We have no
direct measure of their magnitude, but the instability of the year-to-year
industrial pattern of rates of investment, and the greater stability of this
pattern over longer periods, suggest that the errors are not negligible.'2
What should we expect when the period of investment is lengthened?
'Thecorrelations of successive profit rates of individual firms are very high:
AverageCorrelations
Pairs of Tears of Profit Rates
(15 industries)
1945 and 1946 .59




12Notethat the errors in measurement of capital should be at least in part positively
correlated with the errors in measurement of receipts. When companies are reclassified,
both their assets and receipts are allocated to the same industry.
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On our previous argument, lengthening the period over which invest-
ment is measured should reduce the correlation between investment rates
and profit rates. The presence of correlation in the short run is presum-
ably due to one of two factors:either the expectations of future profit
rates were systematically biased—the strength of the forces making for
high or low rates was underestimated—or technological or other limitations
on the firm's ability to adapt to new conditions prevented a complete
elimination of unusual profits or losses.And both of these causes of
correlation are surely weaker in a longer period: errors in expectations
can be corrected; and any limitations on the firm's freedom to adjust
investment diminish with time.
This argument assumes that a misjudgment of the demand for capital
next year cannot be fully corrected next year, that it will require more than
a year to recognize the error in expectations or to make the appropriate
investment or disinvestment to restore the industry's profit rate to equili-
brium, or both.13 This is perhaps a plausible assumption, but its plausi-
bility (which rests on the most casual empirical observation) surely varies
from industry to industry.
This is of course an ex ante view: we are asking why the equilibirium
amount of investment may not be attained next year. To the extent that
the entrepreneurs misjudge the new demand for capital (the shifts of
which we roughly measure by receipts), of course, profit rates will in
actual fact not be at equilibrium next year.They will be higher or
lower, but (in the absence of systematic errors of expectation) they will
not be correlated with investment.
When the period is lengthened to several years, however, surely it will
embrace both unanticipated changes in profit rates and the investment
adjustments they in turn call forth. An unanticipated high profit rate
next year will lead to larger investment the year (or two or three) there-
after and, conversely, an unexpectedly low profit rate will lead to smaller
investment thereafter.This effect will be realized even if, on average,
expectations are correct—it can be the result of unsystematic errors in
anticipation.
The finding that investment in a year is correlated positively with the
previous year's rate of return could be interpreted to support this view.
In year t, the firm invested I expecting a realized rate of return, i-".
Ifin the event the realized rate was ire,investmentwas too large or too
small, and the excess or deficiency was larger, the larger the difference
"Recallthat in our interindustry universe, equilibrium is defined by the profit rate
in an industry relative to that of other industries.
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between expected and realized rates of return.Say the deficiency or
excess was= — ire), with2> 0. Then this amount of invest-
ment should be added to or subtracted from that amount called for by
next year's shift in the demand for capital, and )(1Tg* —ITt) becomesone
of the determinants of next year's total investment. This interpretation
is not independent of that given in the previous subsection, for unexpec-
tedly high profits this year are a relevant basis for predicting larger profits
(with given capital) next year.
In sum, either larger or smaller correlations between investment and
profit rates are therefore possible as the period of time is lengthened.
The regression equations for the two periods used in our study are given
in Table 21. They display the usual strong relationship between invest-
TABLE 21
REGRESSION OF PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN CAPITAL ON PERCENTAGE
CHANGE INRECEIPTSAND ON PROFIT RATE, 1938—56
X1 =percentagechange in total capital
=percentagechange in corporate receipts
=averageprofit rate
1938—47 (n=82)








X1 =—31.70+ .858X, + 6.64X3
(.029) (.816)
R =.957
SOURCE: Data employed from Tables A-14 to A-59; and from Statistics 'tt Income, for
1938, 1947, 1954, and 1956.
ment and receipts,14 and they also give substantially more weight to the
profit rate. Even in the earlier period the regression of relative investment
on profit rates was significant, and in the postwar period it was highly
significant.In both periods, however, introduction of profit rates does
not add appreciably to the "explanation" of the variance of investment
"Therelative changes in capital and receipts for the longer period were calculated
with relativechanges expressed as percentages; in theannual regressions (which were
calculatedsubsequently), thedifferencesin successive logarithms were used.
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rates.15The elasticity of relative investment with respect to relative
receipts was .6 in the annual postwar regressions; it was .9 in the corres-
ponding long-period regression. The difference between the annual and
long-term elasticities is in keeping with expectations :16 entrepreneurs will
make a fuller adjustment of capital to a permanent than to a transitory
change in demand.
EFFECTS OF PRICE CHANGES
Since our three-digit industry data were not deflated, it is necessary to
turn to the two-digit industries for information on the effects of price
TABLE 22
REGRESSION OF PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN CAPITAL ON PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN
OuTPUT AND ON PROFIT RATES, TWENTY-ONE MAJOR INDUSTRIES, 1947—54
=percentagechange in total capital
X2 =percentagechange in output
=averageprofit rate
Book values











SOURCE: Tables A-36 to A-59; and Census of Manufactures, 1954, Vol. IV, Part 4.
changes on the relationships between investment, receipts, and profit
rates. The basic equations for this set of major industry groups are given
in Table 22.' Elimination of price changes has a radical effect upon the
15 If X1 and X2 are relative changes in investment and receipts, respectively, and K5
is profit rates, the correlation coefficients are:
1938—47 1947—541947—56
r12 .753 .917 .926
.181 .325 .393
r23 .060 .234 .167
r123 .756 .915 .949
.207 .285 .640
R52, .765 .924 .957
' A minor difference arises because the long-term regression is based upon percentage
changes, whereas the annual regressions are based upon differences in logarithms. The
exclusion of a single, highly abnormal industry (aircraft)increased the long-term
elasticity from .5 to .8 for the 1947—54 period.
17 The output measure is a ("cross") weighted average of output indexes in the
Census of Manufactures, 1954, Vol. IV, Part 4. The transportation sector is omitted because
the extremely unusual behavior of aircraft greatly affects the regressions.
82THE RATE OF IXVESTMEXT
relative importance of the two independent variables. The dominant part
previously played by changes in receipts no longer holds:in fact, the
coefficient of determination of profit rates becomes larger than that of
physical output.'8 Since investment and receipts are similarly influenced
by movements of prices much more than profit rates are, it is of course
natural that deflation of the data reduces the role of receipts.'° On the
whole, the regression fits the data remarkably well even after deflation.
EXPECTED PROFIT RATES
The role of expected profit rates is crucial in determining the direction and
volume of investment, in the traditional theory. We should naturally like
to observe this variable and introduce it into our analysis, less to test its
relevance (for this can hardly be doubted) than to form a notion of the
quantitative effect of expected rates on investment. Expectations, how-
ever, are fully as difficult to quantify here as elsewhere in economics and,
in particular, the popular method of questionnaire, even were it possible
in our context, would yield results difficult to interpret or to trust. So
we are thrown back on methods of constructing what may be more or
less plausible measures of expectations.
Yehuda Grunfeld proposed the use of the market value of securities of
a firm as an index of expectations of its future earnings.20 There are
substantial forces working to bring the expectations of management and
market together: outside investors will profit by a more accurate set of
predictions of future demands and costs, and management will profit by
sale or purchase of securities if its expectations are superior to and different
from those of the market.
Only modest use can be made of this index of future profits because of
the limitations of data. Market values are available only for large firms
whose securities are listed on exchanges (Grunfeld's work is based on such
companies), and this requirement excludes many industries and raises
doubts concerning the representativeness of the data for others. The avail-
able industry indexes of stock-market values have two other deficiencies for
18Thecorrelation coefficients, in the notation of Table 22, are:





19Thesame price indexes, in fact, enter into output and inventory deflations. °"TheDeterminants of Corporate Investment," in The Demana' for Durable Goods,
Arnold C. Harberger, Ed., University of Chicago Press, 1960.
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our purposes: only market values of common stocks are reported; and
yearly values are the means of high and low quotations (of variable date)
rather than those at a fixed time of year.2' Yet the variable is sufficiently
promising to make even a crude application worthwhile.
The time periods involved in the use of market value as a measure of
expected profits are not self-evident. A given movement of market value
reflects a change in expected earnings sometime in the future, and all one
can say in general is that a given expected change in earnings will have a
larger effect on present market value, the nearer in the future it is to
occur.22 It is possible that profit expectations for the near future dominate
movements of stock-market values, or that the whole level of expected future
earnings is decisive. We use dferences among industries in movements of
market value to measure differences in expected future earnings, and to this
extent remove the effects of changes in the general level of security prices.
Both annual and longer-period regressions will be examined.
The predictions of relative investment in a year by the preceding year's
change in market value turn out rather poorly: in only one year is the
correlation coefficient significantly greater than zero, and it is negative in
two recession years (Table 23).23 The predictions provided by the rate of
return in the preceding year are considerably better, although only in 1951
and 1954 are they significant. The introduction of the preceding year's
relative change in receipts does not appreciably affect either relationship.
This is of course a severe test to impose, for the predictions are uncondi-
tional in the sense that no data from the year in which investment occurs
are employed.24 Even changes in receipts, which are so successful in all
analyses in which they are simultaneous with investment, have no
predictive power: the correlation coefficient is negative in the only year
in which it is statistically significant.
To test the role of market-value changes over a longer period, the
market values in 1947 and 1948 (averaged) were compared with those of
1949 and 1950 (averaged), and the relative change in market value over
21 See S. Cottle and T. Whitman, Corporate Earning Power and Market Valuation, 193.5—
1955, Duke University Press, 1959, P. 12. We are indebted to Cottle and Whitman for
supplying supplementary information.
22 Grunfeld used successive annual time periods for both market value and gross
investment, where the latter is the dependent variable in a regression on market value
and beginning-of-year stock of capital.
23 A larger sample of rates of change in industry stock price indexes compiled by
Standard and Poor were also analyzed for 1948—49 and 1949—50 against the subsequent
year's investment rate, without a significant change in the results. These stock indexes
were taken at the end of year.
24 But it should be noted that r123, in the notation of Table 23, is not very different
if the change of receipts in the year of investment is used.
84THE RATE OF INVESTMENT
TABLE 23
CORRELATION BETWEEN INVESTMENT AND PRoPrr RATES, CHANGE IN MARKET
VALUE AND RECEIPTS, TWENTY-ONE INDUSTRIES, SELECTED YEARS, 1949—54
=investment=logcapitals —logcapital_j
=changein market value =logvalue_1 —logvalueg_,
change in receipts =logreceipts,_, —logreceiptst_,
X4 =profitrate, year (€ —1)
Year r12 T13 r14 r2r r125 r,•5
1949 —.077 .107 —.010 .348 .273 —.123 —.033
1950 .351 — .006 .295 .351 .350 .377 .345
1951 .481 .269 .499 .600 .382 .414 .437
l953 .118 —.412 .154 .398 .462 .337 .169
1954b—.161 —.114 .476 .205 —.150 —.142 .464
a Because1952 data are not available, X, for 1953 is(log capital 1953 —logcapital
1951).
1) For the same reason, X, is(log receipts 1953 —logreceipts 1951).
SOURCE: For market value data, Cottle and Whitman, Corporate Earning Power; other
figures from Tables A-36 to A-59 and Statistics of Income.
that period was correlated with relative investment from 1950 to 1954.
The simple correlation coefficient was .315 (for twenty-one industries).
This result is also less than impressive, but in the light of the deficiencies
of the data it cannot be viewed as wholly unpromising. The performance
of market value as a predictor of investment demand appears to be about
as good in this four-year analysis as it is in the annual analyses.
An alternative method of predicting cx ante profit rates is the extrapola-
tion of recent profit rates. If the industry had previously been in long-run
equilibrium, there would be no basis in past experience for estimating
future returns, which would presumably also be at the equilibrium level
after appropriate investment. But this is only a simple instance of the
general rule that only if a system gets out of equilibrium can one discover
the forces that restore equilibrium. If recent profit rates have not been at
the equilibrium level, they possess predictive value for future profit rates.
If profit rates have been above the average, and rising, the industry will
have rosy profit prospects; if profit rates have been below average, and
falling, the industry's near future is unattractive.
In this interpretation, one might assume that relative investment
(1aC/C) will be some function such as
____
ILR =a+ b(ii— ) +c(i7—1T_1) + d
\t—i
where ir is the profit rate,the average of industries, R is receipts, and the
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subscripts refer to time. The coefficient b should be positive since a profit
rate above average encourages investment, and c should be positive
because rising profit rates should work the same way. Finally, d should be
positive because rising sales also suggest a large investment demand. The
equation can be written
=(a—b)+ (b + c)7r— CTt_i+ d
=A +B+C1 +dI-—--J \itg_1/
withthe expectation that B and dare positive and C negative. In this form,
the equation differs from a simple regression of the rate of investment on
previous years' profit rate and increase in receipts only by the presence of
the profit rate two years before.It is in this form that the regression
equation has been calculated, with differences in logarithms replacing
percentage changes in corporate capital and receipts.
The predictions are again unconditional, in the sense that no data from
the predicted year enter as independent variables so, at best, only modest
results can be expected, and even they are not forthcoming (see Table 24).
In the one year (1950), in which the profit rate of the preceding year has
a statistically significant regression coefficient, it has the wrong sign. The
regression coefficients for the profit rate lagged two years are significant
in 1950 and 1956, but in other years are statistically nonsignificant and
erratic in sign.
The results of both these profit expectation analyses are calculated to
remind one that investment rates are among the most difficult of all
economic magnitudes to predict. One must use very lenient standards of
success in judging unconditional predictions, but even by these stahdards
one can say only that both market value thanges and lagged profit rates
deserve further exploration.
2. Other Possible Determinants of investment Rates
Although the level of demand (here measured by receipts) and profit
rates are taken as the leading determinants of investment in the literature
on the subject, there are a host of other variables which have been
regarded as relevant.In general no strongly influential variables were
found in this canvass, which was severely restricted by data limitations.
CONCENTRATION OF INDUSTRY
The effects of monopoly on the amount of capital invested in an industry
are debated in an extensive literature. The most popular conclusions are
86THE RATE OF IXVESTMEXT
TABLE 24
REGRESSION OF RELATIVF. INVESTMENT ON PREVIOUS RELATIVE CHANGE IN






=.0085+.149X5 —.00035X3—.00052X4 R =.220
(.081) (.0015) (.0012)
1950
=.0629+ .124X, —.0044X,± .0036X4 R =.233
(.099) (.0020) (.0018)
1951
X1=—.0079+ .020X+.0051X, + .0010X4 R.437
(.103) (.0026) (.0020)
1953a
=—.0289—.1072(2+.0061X, + .0022X4 R =.364
(.134) (.0041) (.0033)
1954b
=— .00084—.090X2+ .00482(3 —.0026X4 R=.223
(.057) (.0025) (.0020)
1955
=.0125—.062X2+.0031K, + .0023X4 R=.331
(.085) (.0028) (.0030)
1956
X1 =—.0118+ .0722(2 —.0041X,+ .01032(4 R=.481
(.084) (.0029) (.0028)
1957
2(5 =— .0309—.149K2+ .0039X + .00242(4 R =.343
(.120) (.0035) (.0030)
NoTY: 1952 data not available.
a1951substituted for t —1;1950 substituted for £ —2.
521951substituted for t —2.
SOURCE: Tables A-36 to A-59 and Statis&sofIncome.
that:(1) under monopoly proper or oligopoly there will be less capital,
given demand and cost conditions, than there would be under competi-
tion; and (2) under most cartel systems there will be more capital per
unit of output than under competition. But even if these conclusions are
accepted, they do not settle the question of the effect of monopoly on
investment.It would be quite possible for a monopoly to have 10 per
cent less capital than a competitive industry would have, at each point in
time, but clearly the percentage increase in capital (or investment relative
to initial capital stock) would be identical in the two situations.
The long-term regressions of investment rates on profit rates and
changes in receipts are given in Table 25. In the earlier period there is
a considerable difference within both sets of regression coefficients, but
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TABLE 25
REGRESSION OF RELATIVE CHANGE IN CAPITAL ON RELATIVE CHANGE IN
RECEIPTS AND PROFIT RATE, BY INDUSTRY STRUCTURE, Two PERIODS, 1938—56
=percentageincrease in total capital
2(5 =percentageincrease of corporate receipts











Unconcentrated 37 .313 .41
(.105) (6.32)
.467














Ambiguous 30 .903 —2.15
(.103) (2.83)
.905
Concentrated 14 .851 8.62
(.122) (2.46)
.946
SOURCE: Tables A-14 to A-59; and C-i and C-2.
there are no significant differences between the concentrated and uncon-
centrated industries. The impact of the war on that period, however, is
such that its results are much less relevant than those of the later period.
In the later period the relationships not only fit the data better, in the
sense of higher coefficients of multiple correlation, but the parameters
for the concentrated and unconcentrated industries seem much more
stable.
In the later period, there appears to be one significant difference
between the concentrated and unconcentrated industries. The uncon-
centrated industries' investment rates are considerably less responsive to
changes in profit rates than the concentrated industries' rates are; the
responsiveness to changes in receipts does not differ between the two classes.
The lesser dependence, ex post, of investment on rates of return in
unconcentrated industries may be due to the fact that investment adjusts
more quickly to changes in demand under competition.This pattern
may indeed be viewed as another aspect of the finding (in Chapter 3) that
the industrial pattern of profit rates is more stable in concentrated than in
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unconcentrated industries;given that fact, the differences in long-run
average ratcs of return in unconcentrated industries will be much smaller
and their observed effect on long-run investment rates also smaller.
A closely related question is whether the number of firms in an industry
exerts an independent influence on investment. The hypothesis runs as
follows: the more numerous the firms in an industry, the greater the dis-
persion of their rates of operation relative to "capacity." Therefore, even
if the industry on average is at (say) 80 per cent of capacity, a given
increase in demand will lead those firms at higher rates of operation to
expand investment to handle their share of the increase in demand. This
is presumably a short-run phenomenon—indeed the very notion of
capacity of a firm loses any meaning in the long run.
A rigorous testing of this argument cannot be made with our data.
Only if firms are making the same products in the same geographical
market does the conclusion follow, and we cannot isolate these complicating
influences. A rough test was made by comparing the residuals from our
regression equations (Table 20) relating relative investment to profit rates
and relative changes in receipts, for the years 1949 and 1950, with the
number of corporate tax returns in each industry. No relationship was
found.25
IDLE CAPACITY
A permanent increase in demand for an industry's product will lead to
increased investment if the industry has previously been in long-run
equilibrium. For the "capacity"—meaning by this elusive term the rate
of investment fully appropriate to the previous rate of output—must be
enlarged: more intensive working of the existing plants will almost
always be more expensive than making a suitable expansion of investment.
Our regression equations relating investment to percentage change in
receipts are, in effect, estimates of this relationship for industries whose
outputs are growing. But for industries whose demands are declining, the
relationship will often be much looser.It may require more time to
withdraw capital than expectations and events have allowed, and the
question arises: do industries that have experienced more or less persistent
declines in output display a different investment behavior?
In order to answer this question we have segregated those industries
whose receipts in a given year were smaller than they were two or
three years earlier.In 1950, for example, there were twenty-eight such
25 The correlation coefficients between residuals and number of returns for 98 indus-
tries are —.091 for 1949 and .100 for 1950.
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industries, and the declines from the previous peak receipts26 are compared
with the residuals from the regression equation relating 1950 investment
to 1950 profit rates and to 1950 changes in receipts.This analysis is
possible for four postwar years, and yields the correlation coefficients
shown below.
Rank Correlation: Residuals





None of these correlations is impressive, but their consistency suggests
that delayed withdrawal of capital has been present in even the fairly
broad industrial categories with which we had to deal. Apparently our
TABLE 26
TECHNICAL PROGRESS, INVESTMENT, AND RATE OF RETURN, 1947—54
Percentage Percentage
Increase in Increase in
Output perAverage Rate Assets
Industry Unit of Inputaof Return (book value)
Electric machinery and equipment 28.1 8.50 72.29
Fabricated metal products 28.0 8.68 62.14
Chemicals and allied products 22.5 8.92 65.64
Basic lumber 27.0 9.09 46.86
Petroleum and coal products 16.1 8.01 91.34
Textile mill products 14.4 7.13 27.83
Machinery, except transportation and
electric 13.6 8.26 67.44
Stone, clay, and glass products 12.5 9.05 87.35
Food and kindred products 11.4 6.72 34.01
Rubber products 10.7 6.24 54.69
Furniture and finished lumber 8.8 7.23 54.70
Paper and allied products 8.5 9.93 81.10
Printing and publishing 7.7 7.51 45.34
Apparel and fabric products 6.9 4.51 19.49
Beverages 4.5 7.48 45.08
Tobacco products 3.5 6.46 35.84
Primary metal products 2.7 7.59 66.45
Leather products 0.1 5.52 4.40
1948—53.
SOURCE Based on data from John W. Kendrick, Prodhctivity Trends in the United States,
Princeton for National Bureau of Economic Research, 1961, Appendix D, Table D-IV,
pp. 468—475; and Tables A-36 to A-59, below.
6Thedecline in receipts is log receipts5, —logreceipts49 or log receipts4, —log
receipts47, whichever is numerically larger.
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regressions would be somewhat improved by introducing a lagged as well
as a current relative change in receipts.
OTHER INFLUENCES ON INVESTMENT
Some of the most widely discussed influences on investment are already
implicitly recognized in our analysis.27Shifts in consumer demand, for
example, are already reflected in our receipts measure.
One economic influence on investment, which lurks behind our summary
variables, is technical progress—the reductions in real costs, or improve-
ments in quality or kind of goods. This influence is of the highest interest
to contemporary economists, and certain comparisons of Kendrick's
measures—unfortunately available only at a fairly broad level—with in-
vestments and rates of return are given in Table 26. There are moderately
strong relationships of this measure of progress with investment and rates
of return.28 The former of these results is wholly in keeping with expecta-
tions—large reductions in cost and price will induce large sales and
investment. The relationship between this measure of progress and rates
of return is equally strong, and rather less expected. The inference may
be that the adjustment of investment has not kept pace with the technical
progress in these industries, or that the write-off of research expenditures
leads to an appreciable understatement of capital.
27 The influence of wage rates is discussed in the next chapter
28 The respective rank correlation coefficients are +.46 and +37.
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